contrast, Popper advocated what he referred to as â€˜¿ nominalism'.Definitions should be read from right to left as arbitrary short cuts. Words are tools for communication and the degree of defmition depends upon the purpose for which it is used. For a New Yorker or a Londoner, â€˜¿ snow' or â€˜¿ slush' is probably enough: for the purposes of an Eskimo or an Alpiist, many different words may be necessary
In considering DSMâ€"III, and DSMâ€"IIIâ€"R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987) , I want to try to concentrate on the ideas behind it rather than on the way it has actually been used or abused. Any system can of course be criticised for its abuse, but this is unfair and not relevant unless the system is designed so as to lend itself easily to abuse. Diagnosis is limited to the choice on the list. In medicine in general, a recent report (Payer, 1988) (Spitzer et a!, 1978) . Now for research you may need operational criteria which can be clearly defined and understood, and need not necessarily apply to the total sample of possible patients. The criteria depend, obviously, on the questions to be asked of and answered by the the sake of accurate timing of events, we could only take patients with acute onsets, or sudden relapses. Nowadays, a paper with the title â€oe¿ Crises and life changes preceding the onset or relapse of acute schizophreniaâ€• (Birley & Brown, 1970) would not be publishable where DSMâ€"IIIâ€"R holds sway, although we found no difference between rates of life events before onsets and before relapses. The point is that there are other matters affecting the course of acute schizophrenia such as sex, pre morbid personality, and family environment, as well So reading DSMâ€"IIIâ€"R, even from these few examples, one gets an impression of a search for separate definable conditions, each with their own â€˜¿ validity' and an assumed particular psychopathology.
I am worried about this, as a social psychiatrist, since it seems as though matters such as course and response to treatment are being explained in terms of some essential â€˜¿ nature of the illness' rather than by other, external factors. If I were a suspicious sociologist, I might allege that the factors are â€˜¿ clinical' and â€˜¿ genetic' because these are the ones which â€˜¿ belong' to doctors and are in their control and sphere of influence.
I shall add two final bits of evidence to my case. The first is a significant non-event, like the famous dog that didn't bark in the night. DSMâ€"IIIâ€"R has problems with â€˜¿ uncomplicated bereavement'. It is not regarded as a mental disorder, which â€oe¿ must not be merely an expectable response to a particular eventâ€•. The â€oe¿ merelyâ€• is not, I am sure, a playing down of the natural distress which may be experienced by a bereaved person: the â€oe¿ merelyâ€• refers to a theoretical problems. The vast body of patients are not used for research, so the criteria are not scrutinised for each patient by interested research workers. Thus the reliability may be affected. Zimmerman (1988) has raised this issue: â€oe¿ The widespread use of operational criteria means only that the clinicians and researchers may be using the same criteria, not that the criteria are being used in the same way.â€• Zimmerman maintains that the search for validity is over-riding the attempts to obtain reliability and it is on the issue of validity that, I believe, the essentialist approach begins to show, in the form of the quest for disease entities with characteristic course, response to treatment, and family aggregation. For instance, manic disorder is classified as bipolar disorder even though the episodes may be only manic. It appears to be impossible, by the rules, for somebody suffering from schizophrenia also to have major depressive disorder. Both these decisions make some aetiological assumptions. I want to consider two other rules in more detail.
In DSMâ€"IIIâ€"R the definition for schizophrenia includes â€oe¿ continuous signs of disturbance for at least six monthsâ€•. Most psychiatrists will have come across patients who develop symptoms fulfilling the DSMâ€"IIIâ€"R criteria over a few weeks or even days. They have a variable course, by no means always favourable. Such patients are not regarded as suffering from schizophrenia but from â€oe¿ schizo phreniform disorderâ€•. We are told that â€oe¿ information on the relationship between schizophrenia and schizophreniform disorders from family and genetic studies are contradictoryâ€•. This suggests to me that aetiological theories are being used in the classification with an implication that real essential schizophrenia should generally have a poor outcome, which is more likely, but by no means guaranteed, if the six-months rule operates.
I have a rather special interest, as 
